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No. 5

Liberal Education

(A talk to teachers, occasioned by a proposal to build, within a college, a true college of liberal education)

By ROBERT BAKEWELL MORRISON, S.J.

Department of Religion, St. Louis University

Talk nowadays of culture and of value is so common that, almost automatically, there springs in certain minds an irritation at it and a need to combat the whole phantasmagoria of words that has taken the solid place once occupied in education by classics.

There does not seem to me to be any doubt but that a mind that can enjoy itself with lovely things *because they are lovely* is a cultured mind. There almost has to be that fine leisure, *quam minimum credula postero*, if there is to be the soul-ennobling, soul-filling thing called culture. And you have neither lovely things nor leisure in the purpose of the modern educator with his great frenzy for efficiency and accuracy and speed and 'quantity production.' Horace knew nothing of quantity production when he advised Leuconoe to *wisdom!* Nor was he simply pot-valiant, nor merely a dilettante. He was talking of the heart of happiness, as the poor human heart can snatch at happiness in the bustle and clang of rushing 'civilization.'

And so I stand foursquare for a saner evaluation of 'education,' and I insist that the very word is empty unless it involves, presupposes a capacity of taste and a desire for the lovely, for the beautiful, for that which may appear inane or, at best, amiably useless to the superficial observation, but in very fact is deadly valuable to the inner eye that has been disciplined and can see what lies covered, even though the covering be 'musty dust' and the discipline have been achieved through sweating efforts and drillmaster's cane — I mean, even though the education has been acquired by and with and in and through the classics of Greece and Rome!

You cannot have personality developed unless you have the instruments of development. And personality springs, not in factories of academic appearance — laboratories of chemistry or physics in a modern college — but in the restful atmosphere of ideas and before the inimitable models of the great thinkers, of the great-souled men who saw the fair and tasted it and knew that it was good.

If a very fair survey were to be employed — 'Whom are the modern colleges trying to educate?' — a census report, utilized as advertising blurb by Bernarr McFadden, may tell a tale: "The basic educational culture of the adult United States" was expressed in terms that appal — 49,500,000 grammar school or less, 15,130,000 some high school, 6,400,000 high school, 4,600,000 some college, 2,380,000 college.

The country, as a whole, is not educated; it is simply illiterate. And one of the more obvious needs of the country is recognized as 'organization of leisure time

activities,' so that minds, after their eight hours of this or that, can be set to amuse themselves or, worse, can *be taught to amuse themselves*. The people cannot live within their minds nor with their minds. Vacant minds, needing whirring wheels and clanging cogs to assure them that they are having a good time!

Yet I have known a man to make room for and carry in his meager pack, while he scaled with his comrades a hitherto unscaled mountain, so impractical a thing as *The Confessions of St. Augustine*. He loved that book. He thought it would be a soul-shaking experience to delve lingeringly in the infinite vistas of the soul that Augustine gives and of God in the human soul while he lifted and rested his eyes from time to time over wind-swept icepacks and giddy precipices. He wanted the intellectual contrast — the depths and heights of a man — while he witnessed the spectacle of the depths and heights of God's nature. He was not impractical. But he did know how to live.

And we, the people, must learn how to live, must learn how to hold high our freemen's heads and salute the eternal *principles*, the verities of truth, of beauty, of mind, of will, — of soul! Masses do nothing but follow until the cataclysmic rage takes hold of them and makes them raven and destroy. But humanity needs men, individual men, men who can pierce the skies for grandeur and can find it also in the human heart, in the works of men's imponderable minds, even as the 'much-devising Odysseus' was able to muster divers gifts to the support of his ideals. There is need for the scents of Helicon to rouse nostalgia in the hungry human hearts; there is a necessity for the Attic sunshine to beckon the eyes that grow dim in piecing together machines and in devising ever acuter instruments for destruction.

But personality grows only in contact with personality. Great minds must be at hand for the development of succeeding great—or greater—minds. The inheritance of humanity, that had been cherished and now is thought of so poorly, must be restored to the peak and pinnacle where it should have been guarded better than it has been guarded; else, it had not fallen into such disrepute. We must find again the Voice of The Invisible, and must learn to understand its accents and to appreciate its message and make it known. We must challenge the growing minds of youth with the fine prospect of adventure in the very realm of wonder and of glory, with the promise that knows not failure. Theirs is the privilege to want to dare. Theirs is the prerogative to count costs gaily and to pioneer. Theirs is the hunger to give; theirs is the power of the heroic.

We must not let this challenge find us dawdling—slipped and at ease in sterile joys over the goods we know and have. We must put these goods at the disposal of those whom we would educate by daring to

flaunt in the wistful eyes of youth the rugged requirements and exacting terms of intellectual discipline. Theirs are eyes that betray a bewilderment, for they see no glory. Theirs are eyes that are set seeking by souls truly ahungry for a quest that will be a quest, and that will not just result in so many more bathtubs, radios, motor cars, and in so much more stagnation of the minds that wash, listen, ride, in the overpraised evidences of 'Progress.'

'Progress,' I think, will be a return to the soul-training disciplines of the classics, to the depth-plumbing studies of the fruits of human wisdom, of *human* life, of reality that was great, noble,—or, at any rate, *genial* even in wickedness. Not the marbles of Rome and the stage of Athens, but the tongues that voiced the magnificence of man are the tools I want to be employed in helping youth to fashion itself to culture. The classics, indeed,—the classics truly; I mean, the humane and living tradition of the human grandeur that was Greece and Rome, not the pettifogging gradgrinding of the pedant nor the miserable insistence of the really ignorant and very noxious little souls that can see nothing but syntax, find nothing but rules, know nothing but derivations. I want the classics taught, not the starveling inventions of little minds that never knew, that never could know, the classics—yet all these meretricious and counterfeit insistences have been dubbed 'the classics.' There is no growth in man when it is growth in numbing smallness!

There can be no 'Progress' for man that really advances him an inch along his way unless it be progress of the inner man, development, evolution of the finer man; there can be no truly human conquest unless the business be begun within the heart of the conqueror and leave him richer in a richer world—richer, not in the devastation he has wrought, nor more encumbered with ruined and unrestorable relics of beauty, but richer truly in the invisible possessions, in the heart that feels more finely, the mind that knows more deeply, the will that strikes more boldly—because Truth has been the food, Beauty has been the invitation, God has been the Goal!

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St. Louis University

CLAUDE H. HEITHAUS, S. J.

The Four 'Madnesses' of the *Phaedrus* and the Elements of Christian Worship

BY CLYDE MURLEY
Northwestern University

In rereading the account in Plato's *Phaedrus* of the four 'madnesses' or forms of inspiration, I have been struck by a certain close resemblance to the essential content of the Christian service of worship. We cannot, of course, equate them severally with portions of the service as they succeed each other in order of time. But, as Aristotle in *Poetics* 1450a used the word μέρη of the essential elements of tragedy, so μέρη is here used (265B) of the basic kinds of inspiration.

The Prophetic Madness of the 'God-intoxicated' persons suggests, in this connection, the function of the priest, be it in the sermon or in another inspired capacity when he functions as the vicegerent of God. There is an Old Testament passage in which we are informed that those now called 'prophets' were previously called 'seers'; and neither the Hebrew nor the Greek words translated 'prophet' necessarily imply 'fore-telling' but only 'forth-telling' or revealing. So the priest is inspired by the Prophetic Madness.

The Orgiastic Madness has to do with the experience of religion, that of the initiate in the old mysteries or of the communicant at the Mass, the participation and exaltation of the worshipper in the religious exercise. The purpose of this orgiastic madness, says Plato, is to secure, by resort to prayers to the gods and service of them and through use of purifying symbols and rites, a release from evils present. This amounts to a kind of atonement. By Socrates' influence "we are amazed and possessed," says Alcibiades (*Symp.* 215E). "Much more than the hearts of the Corybantes does my heart beat and tears pour forth, under this man's words."

The third, the Poetic Madness, finding an impressionable and virginal soul, arousing it and making it to revel in odes and other poesy, provides a spiritual education through hymns which become traditional. We might think of this inspiration as resulting in the whole liturgy of the service.

For the Erotic Madness, I make what may appear at first glance a surprising application. It parallels, in my opinion, the theology which underlies the service of worship and recurs in it. It is immediately after his reference to it that Plato goes on to discuss the arguments for the immortality of the soul, considered as a self-mover, details of religious psychology, and even the doctrine of Ideas. We are not here concerned with the details of his theology. The significant thing is that he attaches the intellectual attempt to the erotic inspiration. Those so inspired, we are told in *Symposium* 218B, share the philosopher's madness and revelry.

In the *Symposium*, just as Love is directed to that Beauty which it lacks (200A), so the philosopher is midway between the uninspired, ignorant and the wise

(204B), that is, the gods (204A). He loves, desires the knowledge which he lacks. The sophists had presumed to use words involving actual attainment of knowledge: σοφοί, σοφισταί, μαθηταί. Socrates claims only the yearning and the quest for it.

This view of the erotic madness is consistent with Socrates' position as a superprofessor of education. The maieutic digression of the *Theaetetus* (149f.) is obviously pedagogical, representing him as assisting at the birth of the brain child. The old philosopher had assumed ironically this erotic mask (*Symp.* 215). In *Symposium* 177E, *Lysis* 204B, *Theages* 128B (spurious presumably, but copying the Platonic phrases), he claims no other knowledge than the 'erotic.'

Whether it be in other forms of the desire to know, or when men seek God, groping in the dark (ψηλαφῶ: *Phaedo* 99B, *Acts* 17.27), the modesty of their approach to the ultimate is appropriately motivated by the 'erotic madness' as Plato meant it—a nobler curiosity than that of the merely φιλήκοος (*Rep.* 475D; cf. *Acts* 17.21).¹

¹ For a fuller treatment of this theme, see "The Significance of the Erotic Figures in Plato" in the forthcoming volume of *Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association*.

Version

No longer mourn for me when I am dead
Than you shall hear the surly sullen bell
Give warning to the world that I am fled
From this vile world, with vilest worms to dwell:
Nay, if you read this line, remember not
The hand that writ it; for I love you so,
That I in your sweet thoughts would be forgot,
If thinking on me then would make you woe.
O! if, I say, you look upon this verse
When I perhaps compounded am with clay,
Do not so much as my poor name rehearse,
But let your love even with my life decay;
Lest the wise world should look into your moan,
And mock you with me after I am gone.

SHAKESPEARE.

Hactenus, Asterie, tibi sint mea fata dolori
Nuntiet atroci dum tuba dira sono
Iam caput, indignans lucem, descendere nostrum
Qua magis indigno tabeat umbra malo.
Neve mei, mea si releges post forte, memento
Qui fuerim; magnus nam mihi sanxit amor
Ut tibi de toto pulsum me pectore malim,
Quam memori lacrimas, vita, ciere tuas.
Hos igitur versus si tu respexeris olim,
Cum fortasse mei nil nisi pulvis erit,
Deprecor a, veteris ne tantum vivat amoris
Quod referat nomen sub tua labra meum;
Ne desiderii damnet te conscia Roma,
Omnia suspendens Roma supercilio.

University of California

H. R. W. SMITH

Latin Mottoes

You may be interested to know that many of our national defense bodies have Latin mottoes. The Air Corps especially has the following on its insignia:

First Pursuit Group: "Aut Vincere aut Mori."
Eighteenth Pursuit Squadron: "Unguibus et Rostro."
Second Bombardment Group: "Mors et Destructio."
Third Attack Group: "Non Solum Armis."
Engineering School: "Animis Opibusque Parati."
Technical School: "Sustineo Alas."
Ninth Observation Group: "Semper Paratus."
Sixth Composite Group: "Parati Defendere."
The Marines have "Semper Fidelis."

University of San Francisco

LLOYD R. BURNS, S.J.

Meditation on Death

(Horace, *Odes* 2.14)

Alas,
The years glide by on hasting wings,
My Postumus, and virtue brings
No stay to furrowed brow, nor age
That waits not, nor death's conqu'ring rage,
E'en if on each day of thy life
Three hundred kine should stain the knife
To please the god of tearless eye
Whose prisoners confined lie—
Great Geryon of three-fold frame,
And Tityus — by the wave whose name
Is baleful to all men of earth,
For all must sail it: those whom birth
Hath giv'n to rule with regal hand,
And those who stoop to till the land.
In vain we flee from bloody Mars,
From booming Adriatic's bars;
In vain do men cool shelters find
To shield themselves from Autumn's wind:
Cocytus' darkling, sluggish stream;
Danaan nymphs of ill esteem;
And Sisyphus, old Aeolus' son,
Whose mighty work is never done—
All these must men know after life.
This earth, thy house, thy winsome wife
Thou soon must leave; and ne'er thy trees,
Save but the one that cannot please—
The cypress, hateful to all men—
Shalt thou behold or prune again.
Thy Caecuban thy son shall drink,
More wise than thou, who wouldst not think
To serve it at a pontiffs' feast.
Thou say'st a hundred keys at least
Must lock it up: thy haughty wine
Shall stain the floor in after time!

West Baden College

THOMAS J. DIEHL, S.J.

Classical Plays in Dallas, Pennsylvania

Dear Sir:

For the past four years the students at College Misericordia, Dallas, Pa., have presented a Greek drama in English in honor of their dean, Sister Mary Borromeo.

The initial venture was *Andromache* in 1938. After that followed *Alcestis* in 1939, and *Trojan Women* in 1940. This year as a change from tragedy, the students presented Aristophanes' *Thesmophoriazusae*.

As the faculty and the students enjoy these plays, we hope to continue this custom annually.

MARY ROAN.

May we not have similar reports from other schools?

The Latin Element in Johnson's Style

The Latin element lent weight, sonority, and cadence to Johnson's style, but his chief reason for employing it seems to have lain deeper than this. It is necessary to observe that it is not constant. In the lighter essays, and in narrative and merely descriptive parts of the *Lives of the Poets*, it subsides; but in the moralistic or sententious writings it strongly predominates. When Johnson refused to write Goldsmith's epitaph in English, he had reasons; a learned man's epitaph, he insisted, 'should be in ancient and permanent language' to insure 'classical stability.' Everything intended to be universal and permanent should be in Latin.

In these latter days of literary informality Johnson's preference for words of Latin origin is not much liked. It has been often assumed that he made easy things hard in his fondness for polysyllabic grandeur, but the test of actual and intelligent reading will show how sincere was his hatred of 'that offense which is always given by unusual words.' If the reader sometimes comes upon things 'equiponderant' or 'colorific,' or hears of 'the tortuosity of imaginary rectitude,' yet he has no doubt at all of Johnson's meaning.—Charles Grosvenor Osgood, *Selections from the Works of Samuel Johnson* (N. Y., Henry Holt; 1935), xxxii.

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Editorial

The most important of the immediate aims in teaching the classics is to help the student to a deep appreciation of pure literature in general and classical literature in particular. That is sound theory, and no one questions it. But in the routine of the classroom there is a danger of overemphasizing this goal. College teachers, at all events, often complain that students fresh from the high school are badly instructed in grammar. If literature is to become the student's lasting possession and a forming influence in his life, he must pay the price; he must lay hold of literature by a mastery of the language in which it is enshrined. He must be a seeker, a *studiosus*, to whose patient toil it will yield its treasure. Language and literature are the *lucida sidera* which guide the mariner into classical lands and seas. Without knowledge of Latin and Greek, the knowledge of literature is only secondhand. "Antiquity speaks her inmost thoughts only to those who comprehend her native tongue."²

All this is obvious and needs no further insistence. But the complaint has recently been heard that "at times academic honors are conferred upon students who have indeed a fair knowledge of the ancient languages and literatures, yet are shockingly ignorant of Greek and Roman history,³ geography, topography, economics, politics, religion, architecture, sculpture, and private life. The ancient authors are at times treated as though they were ghosts suspended in a vacuum, divorced from the world around them, isolated from the race that made their greatness possible."

There is truth in this observation. A man is best understood when seen in his surroundings. Great art, in particular, bears the national stamp as pronouncedly as it does the artist's personal signature. Aeschylus and the Athens of his time—these are the real creators of the *Persae*.⁴ It is the life, the fortunes, the ideals, of an entire nation that come to fruition in individual genius, and there is no real understanding of great literature without a knowledge of the very soil that gave it birth. To relegate these studies in background to meagre footnotes in the large folios of classical literature is to sin against the sense of proportion.

True as this is, it is not the whole truth. Not all schools can offer the same facilities for classical study. Nor do the same ideals always animate all the members of even the same faculty. Local conditions, moreover, as well as personal tastes, necessarily determine the type of training imparted in any given school. 'Human nature' may well be blamed for this; but obviously, it is the business of the *school* so to integrate the curriculum that its final advantage to the student will be the 'harmonious development of all his faculties, regardless of whether he spends eight or six or four or even two years in classical study. And furthermore, it is the business of the individual *teacher* so to master the whole round of classical lore as to be able to give each legitimate objective its proportionate share of attention. More important than works of reference in the library or regular courses in this branch or that, is the teacher's personal equipment. If he is a person of broad culture he will find the right word at the right time and supply the deficiencies of the curriculum over which he has no control. His teaching will be well balanced even when the curriculum is not.

Major aims call for major emphasis; and as for secondary objectives, it is as fatal to overemphasize them as it is unsafe to ignore them altogether. An unbalanced program can give no more than an unbalanced education, and that is no 'education' at all.

¹ This is true of the grown-up student. But what about the child? Is grammar too much for him? Read the delightful little rhapsody, "In Such Days as These," an address by President Herbert Davis of Smith College before the Classical Association of Western Massachusetts, October 14, 1941; published in *Classical Weekly*, December 15, 1941; page 99.

² Alfred P. Dorjahn, *THE CLASSICAL BULLETIN*, January 1942, p. 25.

³ J. W. Mackail's brilliant sketch, "The Italy of Virgil and Dante," *Studies in Humanism* (Longmans, Green and Co.; 1938), pp. 70ff., strikingly illustrates what the knowledge of history may do for the reader of the *Aeneid*.

⁴ "It seems a little misleading to speak of the *Persae* as an historical play. It is rather a national celebration." Gilbert Murray, *Aeschylus* (Oxford U. Press; N. Y. 1940), p. 115. Significant, too, is the title of a book just off the press: *Aeschylus and Athens: A Study in the Social Origins of Drama*, by George Thomson; London: Lawrence and Wishart; 1941.

The question of balance has at all times exercised the minds of serious educators. In Tacitus's *Dialogus* (31), for instance, Messala describes the ideal orator as "the man who, while he ought thoroughly to absorb some branches of study, ought to have a bowing acquaintance with them all" (W. Peterson). Tacitus's own phrasing of the idea is in itself a classic: *qui quasdam artes haurire, omnes libare debet*. Might not this be our own motto in preparing our young students 'for life'?

Speaking of the education of Athenian boys, Walter Miller has this significant paragraph:¹

The supreme objective of education was the production of a cultivated, enlightened, and capable citizenship; that is, it was training for right living and intelligent leadership. It sought to secure the proper balance of physical and mental strength, the harmonious development and control of all the natural powers and impulses. Their athletic system aimed to give grace of bearing, presence of mind, strength of limb, agility of movement, alertness in time of crisis, and endurance under heavy strain. The accompanying school system aimed at a corresponding all-round, symmetrical development of the mental faculties: quick perception, correct intuition, retentive memory, and keen judgment, with sound character and unflinching good taste. The

Athenian summed it all up in the one word, *sophrosyne*, which we may translate by several different words: self-control, moderation, temperance, modesty, dignity.

¹ *Greece and the Greeks: A Survey of Greek Civilization* (The Macmillan Company; 1941), p. 91.

Some Ancient and Modern Aspects of *Ius Gentium*¹

BY OSCAR E. NYBAKKEN

The State University of Iowa

From a recognition, at least in part, of the fact that all political units must be based on a community outlook in regard to some essentially human values, the practical and juristically-minded Romans, especially after they had reduced many of the independent states into the condition of subject provinces, formulated a kind of 'law of nations,' the *ius gentium*.

No universal agreement on the exact meaning of the term *ius gentium* has been reached. It is sometimes used, as by Cicero in *De Off.* III,17,69, in contradistinction to the *ius civile*, and thus may be said to have a 'practical' value in attempting to understand its application to Roman society. In the sources, however, *ius gentium* is most generally used in a 'theoretical' sense in which it has derived much of its significance from Greek philosophical thought. This seems also to accord with the fact that the Romans did not, as a rule, distinguish morals from law. Cicero,² as did Gaius (I, 1) later, identified the *ius gentium* with 'natural law' (*ius naturale, lex naturae*), and by so doing gave it validity as a code of rules common to all mankind. Thus, the *ius gentium* had close relation also with the so-called 'customary law' (*consuetudo*) which, although not written, was nevertheless held to be valid and real law (Cicero, *Part. Orat.* 37,130). For as stated by Cicero in *De Invent.* II,22,67, long voluntary usage and consent among all is equivalent to law. Another element which added force and significance to this law was Roman adherence to the *mos patrius* or *mores maiorum*. These 'traditions of the elders' had powerful governing functions and disciplinary and authoritarian value, not necessarily because they were determined as right by reason, but because they had proved their worth through long age and permanency. In Mommsen's words, the *ius gentium* was 'das ungeschriebene allgemeine Recht.' The fact that it was largely unwritten and was not in a technical sense a body of *iura*, did not prevent it from being a real and vital element both in the formation and the administration of all law; it was, as a matter of fact, 'a ferment operating all over the law.'³

In principle, the Romans were not inclined to codify their law, and they used much reserve in regard to enactment of statute law. This left a large field for the *ius incertum*. In trying to reconcile abstract justice in each case with what was reasonable and honorable, maxims were often seriously employed, such, for example, as those phrased by Justinian in the opening book of the Institutes: *honeste vivere, alterum non laedere, suum cuique tribuere*. These, of course, were not legal principles at all, but they nevertheless determined the tone and direction of Roman law. Moreover, deviation from strict adherence to the form of the law, and the tendency to greater leniency, were in no small part due to the growth of *humanitas*, in deference to which many Romans acknowledged the universal bond

between all people and their consequent duty toward their fellow men, and the moral duty of tempering justice with mercy. A further reason still for the flexibility of Roman law was the fact that the Romans were not inclined to employ the process of abstraction, that is, of drawing from individual cases and decisions an abstract principle which should be rigidly applied in like or similar cases. The basis of appeal was rather to *aequitas*, which might be called 'the common reason of the thing.' After Cicero's time especially, the intent (*voluntas*) rather than the strict and literal meaning (*verba*) of the legal rule was given prominence. There was at times, therefore, as was noted also by Cicero (*Pro Caec.* 23,65), a rather definite contrast between the *ius strictum* and *aequitas*.

International jurisdiction was required early in Roman history. There were many foreign states both within and beyond the confines of the Italian peninsula, and with these Rome had treaties, both political and commercial. Among the separate individual states which composed the *civitas gentium* there existed a certain *comitas gentium* which was recognized in Rome in several ways⁴; force was not the only method employed. Yet the relations between these states were not so close as to cause either party willingly to submit to the exclusive jurisdiction of the other's court. Hence Roman civil law was not applied to foreigners, but they were given special treatment by the praetor. With Rome's expansion, the effort to make equitable decisions in cases involving foreigners created new and more acute problems. A special Foreign Praetor was therefore appointed to hear such cases. His chief function was to preserve, in dealings with foreigners, obligations which, although not strictly legal, were nevertheless considered moral and obligatory. The Peregrine Praetor was not legally bound by precedent, and in civil proceedings had the freedom to refuse or to grant hearings. As in the Roman domestic sphere much was left to the discretion of the *Paterfamilias*, so in the sphere of state discipline much was left to the discretion of the magistrate. The Praetor, therefore, had to have a good sense of *aequitas*, and since the actions brought before him involved foreigners, this sense of justice and fairness had to be based not only on the standards of his own day and his own nation, but also on the practice of other civilized nations and communities. His decisions could not rest solely on his own personal feelings or on an excessive veneration for the *mos maiorum*, for example, but had to show consideration also for the most likely majority opinion among the most reasonable individuals of his time. The law which was applied recognized various rights in alien peoples and consisted partly of Roman provisions and partly of the national laws of the Peregrine interpreted in light of common reason. Through a long refining process in the court of the Peregrine Praetor and through his edicts, there grew up, therefore, a sort of private fixed 'international law,' or 'law of the world.' This law was not strictly scientific, but was at best merely regulative, and tended to restrict the formality of all Roman law and make it more dependent on a general sense of justice and fairness.

The *ius gentium* was not, then, a formal agreement in statutory form accepted by all nations, but merely a

constructive and inferred agreement based on the common acceptance of rules which had been long obeyed and the violations of which had been denounced. It differed from other law in that no specific sanctions were applied, and its source was rather in practice than in enactments. The controlling force was the *ius naturale* which, in the words of Cicero (*De Rep.* III,22,33), is imperishable and prevails over all else: *Est quidem vera lex recta ratio naturae congruens, diffusa in omnes, constans, sempiterna, quae vocet ad officium iubendo, vetando a fraude deterreat. . . . Huic legi nec obrogari fas est neque derogari ex hac aliquid licet neque tota abrogari potest. . . . nec erit alia lex Romae, alia Athenis, alia nunc, alia posthac, sed et omnes gentes et omni tempore una lex et sempiterna et immutabilis continebit.* These words have been re-echoed by Grotius, Blackstone, and many other distinguished legalists since.

In the seventeenth century when Grotius—who is generally called the founder of modern international law—wrote his treatise, *De Iure Belli ac Pacis*, the disorders of his time demanded some remedy. With the weakening of the spiritual and social forces of the church and feudalism, sovereign nations gradually emerged. Every nation which had unity of territory, population, and government, and possessed such fundamental institutions as an army, a regular administration of justice, and (later) a method of diplomatic intercourse, could become a member of this 'family of nations.' The ties which bound these nations together were not as strong, however, as those which held together Mediaeval Europe. For behind the walls of its sovereignty each nation conducted its political, religious, social, and cultural affairs much as it wished, and thus developed its own morality and customs. Yet, especially with the growth of trade, a certain amount of intercourse was inevitable between the independent states and between individuals of each, so that some code of conduct to ensure the observance of justice and good faith in their mutual intercourse was demanded. In search for a secular principle to replace the spiritual, Grotius turned to Roman sources. There in the *ius gentium* he found that there already existed rudimentary laws guiding international customs and usages. He discovered the chief doctrines of right reason pronouncing some actions as morally wrong and others as morally right, and the idea that this sense of right is universal and unalterable and could be applied to relations between nations. Grotius was aware, however, of the significant fact that, since sovereignty (*summa potestas*) rested in each state, international law could not be backed by specific sanctions. It, like the *ius gentium* of the Roman era, was based mainly on the moral axiom which Grotius laid down as follows in his Introduction: "A citizen who conducts himself in accordance with the laws of his country does not thereby behave foolishly, although, in consequence of these laws, he must deny himself certain things which might be of advantage to himself personally. Similarly a nation cannot reasonably be considered foolish that does not so strongly emphasize its own interests as to tread under foot the common law of states and nations. The cases are identical, for a citizen who for his direct advantage infringes the social law of the country destroys the foundation of his higher interests and at the

same time those of his descendants. The nation that opposes the law of nature and the law of nations overthrows the bulwark of its future peace."

Since the establishment of a family of sovereign nations in the time of Grotius we have seen the failure of such pacts as the Holy Alliance of 1815, based though it was on Christian principles of charity and peace, and entered into for the high purpose of conserving religion, justice, and peace in Europe; the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907 in which nations fervently recognized the moral ties which unite civilized peoples and thereby sought to strengthen international justice; and the League of Nations which, as a court of arbitration, raised great hopes and expectations that already have been frustrated and shattered. In spite of these failures the concept of *ius gentium*, though it may seem worthless now, continues as a significant force. All nations, even the greatest evildoers, take pains to prove that their actions are justified by international law or, if not by international law, then according to some higher standard. Organizations like the 'Institute of International Law,' established by the voluntary collaboration of distinguished lawyers of many nations, draw up *corpora iuris gentium* which read very much like a restatement of the elementary rights of man. These facts indicate that some homage is still paid the *ius gentium*. Inherent in the *ius gentium* is that 'formative sense of justice' which is born with man, and which does not like a language, for example, need to be learned, but is apparent, of constant value, and valid at all times. Those who abuse or neglect it court troubles and difficulties which may throw the world into agonizing strife. Theoretically at least, the *ius gentium* remains law even if the world goes to pieces striving over it, and even after all safeguards of justice which man has yet been able to devise by purely legalistic treatises or even by the most carefully formulated and written constitutions have collapsed.

Only because of a fortunate combination of circumstances can Rome be said to have observed somewhat more strictly than some other nations the moral principles of the *ius gentium*. She, as well as States before and after her, found good use for the principle 'My country, right or wrong,' and sought to make State interests appear synonymous with impartial justice. But the moral principles which form the basis of the *ius gentium* are not destroyed because men seem to have made little progress towards a realization of justice in international relations.

¹ Read at the Language and Literature Conference, The State University of Iowa, December 5, 1941.

² *De Off.* III,5,23; *Tusc. Disp.* I,13,30; *De Leg.* II,5,11-13; *De Har. Resp.* 14,32; *De Invent.* II,22,65-67.

³ W. W. Buckland, *A Text-Book of Roman Law from Augustus to Justinian* (Cambridge; 2 ed. 1932), 55.

⁴ Coleman Phillipson, *The International Law and Custom of Ancient Greece and Rome* (The Macmillan Company; 1911), I,107f.

The Fine Art of Teaching Latin

Classical scholarship makes great demands on the intelligence; and the teaching of Latin is a fine and laborious art. For its effective exercise two requirements must be fulfilled; first, that the teacher have accurate knowledge of what he teaches; secondly, that he can convey into his teaching a sense of the human value of what is being read. Of these, the former takes priority.—J. W. Mackail, *Studies in Humanism*; p. 60.

An Approach to Latin Pronunciation¹

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The Catholic Classical Club of Greater New York is happy to unite with Fordham University on the occasion of its Centenary Celebration to jointly sponsor this session devoted to the problem of the pronunciation of Latin in Catholic Schools. That there is a problem, a problem that is very old, has been ably demonstrated by Dr. Susan B. Martin in her inaugural address of this session. It behooves us, then, to reopen the case of Latin pronunciation, to examine it objectively, and to determine what system of pronunciation is best adapted to our Catholic schools in this day and age. I say, in this day and age, because I view this, not only as a scientific question, but also and even primarily as a question of psychology and expediency.

It seems to me, that three successive considerations are in order:—1. What system of pronunciation of Latin is sanctioned by the linguistic and literary evidence at our disposal; in other words, what is the scientifically correct pronunciation of Latin? 2. What system is most practical today in view of the different speech patterns of Latin, English, and Italian? 3. What system is most desirable in view of the cultural conditions under which our Catholic children live?

Three tests, then, must be applied to any system of Latin pronunciation—the test of scientific accuracy, the test of practicality, and the test of desirability. It is my duty this afternoon to examine the question from the point of view of *scientific accuracy*, in accordance with the norms and evidence of linguistic science. The other two points will be treated by the succeeding speakers.

My primary duty, I presume, is to evaluate for you the evidence of the scientifically established pronunciation of Latin. There are numerous sources which yield us fragmentary evidences of the correct pronunciation of Latin in classical and postclassical times. The first of these, the one that yields the fundamental, basic evidence, is *tradition*. Latin has been a constant living force in the Western world since Roman times, marching up the centuries in two mighty columns, the learned, classical tongue, and the Romance, vulgar tongues. The former has been spoken for 1900 years without any intentional change, except in modern times, and the nature of these modern changes is easily discerned. It offers us uniform testimony from all parts of the Western world on essential features of pronunciation. The evidence from tradition, for example, is unanimous in making *t* and *d* dental stops, *m* and *n* nasals, *s* and *f* fricatives. Such data are basic, fundamental, and can be established beyond the shadow of a doubt by tradition.

The popular, Romance tradition is also rich in data relative to pronunciation. The study of Romance comparative philology reveals the state of Latin when the vulgar tongues diverged from the mother Latin, a state not too different from the classical Latin of our school texts. For example:—Italian *grande*, French *grand*, Spanish *grande* point to a Vulgar Latin *grande(s)*. The classical Latin form is *grandis*. The testimony of the Romance tongues leads us to believe that *g* was a voiced stop, *r* a trilled liquid, *n* a dental nasal, *d* a voiced

dental stop, and the final *s* a very slightly articulated element, tending to total disappearance. And so, by painstaking efforts, studying the evidences supplied by thousands of words, we can reconstruct the articulation of Latin, at least so far as the basic elements of speech are concerned.

We can also approach the problem from another angle, and direct our inquiry through Indo-European comparative philology, studying the phonemic relationship of Latin to the Slavic, Germanic, Celtic, Indic, Iranian, and Greek languages. We shall find that these lead us to the same conclusions as the other sources of information on pronunciation. They also, for example, point to *g* as a voiced stop, *d* as a voiced dental, *n* as a dental nasal, and so on.

These are the great sources of basic knowledge of pronunciation of Latin. They reveal the main, the fundamental phonemic structure of the language. But there are other sources that help to support and refine the data secured from tradition and comparative philology. Chief among them is the large body of grammatical literature composed by native Roman grammarians and gathered for us into 7 sizeable volumes by the German scholar Heinrich Keil. These *Grammatici Latini* are source material of the first order since they are most specific in indicating the articulation of the phonemes of the language, even to describing the position and function of the speech organs in the production of a given sound.

In addition we have evidence of pronunciation in Latin metrical literature, in puns and alliterations, in transliterations from Latin into other languages and vice versa, in ancient etymologies, in the configurational harmony existing within the sound pattern of the language, in the phonetic spellings of inscriptions, in the orthography of old MSS., and in the phonological and morphological changes operating within the Latin language.

We have at hand an abundance of material, but material that requires sifting, critical evaluation and scientific interpretation. On almost any sound, several items of information are available and we must keep two general principles clearly in mind in studying them. (1) No existing evidence is conclusive proof of the exact pronunciation of any sound; our knowledge permits us to determine only the *approximate* pronunciation of a sound, not the exact pronunciation. (2) Language is in a state of constant flux, and so we must always observe strict chronology when sifting the data on any sound; language, you know, is a social factor and, like style, varies with time and place.

But the mass of material at hand must not be confided to any chance Latinist for interpretation. Only the trained philologist is capable of this delicate and complicated process. And in the modern science of linguistics, well-nigh an exact science now, we have our last and most important source of information on Latin pronunciation; most important, because it not only supplies data in its own right but is in addition the only agency capable of evaluating and interpreting the data supplied by all other sources. And why do the data from other sources require so much careful study? Because they are seldom clearly conclusive and prepon-

derant, usually fragmentary and elusive, sometimes seemingly contradictory. Tradition is a very fallible source and bears wary watching; comparative philology is a science and only a trained specialist can interpret its data; the Roman grammarians require infinite care in using them because they were not trained phoneticians and often were uncritical borrowers from their Greek predecessors. And so on with the other sources of our data. Only the trained philologist and phonetician is capable of handling them correctly. But handled correctly, they can yield us very definite information on the pronunciation of Latin in use in the days when Cicero electrified the senate with his surpassing eloquence, or in the days when St. Augustine moved the souls of his people with the divine power of his sermons. And this work of interpretation has been done by linguistic scholars, and is presented nowhere more succinctly and clearly than in Professor Edgar H. Sturtevant's book, "The Pronunciation of Greek and Latin," which appeared in a 2nd revised edition during the past year.²

And what is the pronunciation of classical Latin that the linguistic scientist has arrived at after a thorough study of available data? It is the so-called classical pronunciation, the pronunciation which makes every *c* and *g* a guttural stop, every *t* a dental stop, never affricates; which pronounces *ae* as 'eye' and *oe* as 'oy'; which says *wikissim*, *kailum*, *Kaisar* and *Kikero*, *Graiki* and *Belgai*. That is the pronunciation which the data authorize.

Can we say, then, that those who use this classical pronunciation speak Latin exactly as Cicero and Vergil did? Not at all. Remember, I said before that a guiding principle in our investigation must always be that only *approximation* of the Latin pronunciation of Cicero and Vergil is possible. Besides, there are many points about which we must confess doubt or even ignorance, e.g., the pronunciation of *gn*, the pronunciation of unaccented vowels in a word and of unstressed elements in a sentence, the nature of sentence accent as opposed to word accent, the pronunciation of *i* in *maximus*, *paximus*, *clipeus*. Is any authority sure of the exact sound of open *o* or of closed *e*, or of the relative amounts of stress and quantity in a Latin word? Finally the devotees of the classical pronunciation usually center attention on the most obvious facts in the classical pronunciation, e.g., *c*, *g*, *t*, *ae*, *oe*, *v*, and ignore the less obvious, e.g., distinctions of quantity in long and short vowels, the pronunciation of *b* as *p* before *s* and *t*, the articulation of *t* and *d* as pure dentals and not alveolars as in English, the very weak articulation of final *s* and *m*.

But what we should know is that philology has reconstructed the pronunciation of Latin with very proximate exactitude, and even though the tests of practicality and desirability lead us to choose another system of pronunciation, we should do so with a clear conception of the evidence that sanctions the restored pronunciation as the one closest to the true pronunciation of Classical Latin.

One last word, if I may. Is there any scientific evidence supporting the Italian pronunciation used in so many of our Catholic schools? Yes, there is—but not

for the period of the classical authors. Recall the principle I enunciated before, viz., that all language is in a state of constant flux. By the 4th and 6th centuries A.D. many sounds of Latin had changed considerably from what they had been during the 1st century, though many features of this later pronunciation were already in their earliest stages of transformation during the 1st century and are reflected in the phonetic spellings of plebeian inscriptions. Several of these late Latin sounds are preserved in modern Italian. Allow me to present briefly the pertinent facts:—

C and *g*, which were undoubtedly mutes in the classical period, became affricates in the 6th century A.D. The *v*, which was always pronounced *w* in classical times, became identical in sound with *b* about A.D. 250. Consequently *bibere* and *vivere* became identical in sound, and lead to the famous pun about the happy Iberian for whom *vivere est bibere*. About the 3rd century the dental stops *t* and *d* became affricates. The diphthongs *ae* and *oe* became monophthongs by the 4th century A.D., *ae* becoming an open *e*, *oe* a closed *e*. This tendency to monophthongization was widespread in rural Italy in the 1st century A.D. and is reflected in the plebeian inscriptions even of Rome at that early date.

These sounds which became current in the Latin of the early middle ages, the Latin of E. K. Rand's "Founders of the Middle Ages," have passed into Modern Italian to a great extent and so are used by us, who, for reasons of practicality and desirability, use the Italian pronunciation in our classes. So, we may say that those who use the classical pronunciation approximate (to a greater or less extent, depending on each individual speaker) the pronunciation of the golden age of Latin, Vergil's Latin; while those who employ the modern Italian sound pattern in speaking Latin, are using many of the linguistic features of the late empire and the early Middle Ages.

¹ The particular session of the Academic Triduum commemorating the Centenary of Fordham University, at which I presented this paper, was jointly sponsored by the University and the Catholic Classical Club of Greater New York. The general topic of this session was, The Pronunciation of Latin in Catholic Schools.

² Distributed by the Secretary of the Linguistic Society of America; University of Iowa, Iowa City.

It is often forgotten, to be sure — but should not be — that Hellas, in her brief age of flowering, made discoveries in science — in mathematics, in astronomy, in geometry, in physics, even in biology — which all must allow to be as wonderful as her literature, and some may consider even more valuable. — Sir Arthur Quiller-Couch, *Studies in Literature*: Third Series; Cambridge University Press; 1929; p. 188.

The object of the most clear-sighted thinkers and administrators is to reinstate, while there is still time, the ideal of humanism. . . . Now the use of Greek is this, that it lies at the base of humanism. . . . Education without Greek may be, and often is, very good; but with Greek it is better. . . . No democratic nation can fulfill the height of its mission unless it develops the highest possible level of culture throughout the community. No nation conscious of its own greatness and realizing in what national greatness consists can afford to do without the highly cultured citizen who is of vital power in civic or state affairs, or the trained scholar whose function is to keep up the quality and standard of culture.—J. W. Mackail, "What is the Good of Greek?" in *Studies in Humanism* (Longmans, Green and Co.; 1938), p. 47.

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